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Abstract 
Using data for 49 African countries over the years spanning 2000-2012, and controlling for a 
wide range of factors, this study empirically assesses the effects of formal institutions on ICT 
adoption in developing countries.  It deploys 2SLS and FE regression models, (a) to estimate 
what determines ICT adoption and (b) to trace how ICT adoption affects inclusive 
development. The results show that formal institutions affect ICT adoption in this group of 
countries, with government effectiveness having the largest positive effect and regulations the 
largest negative effect. Generally, formal institutions appear more important to ICT adoption in 
low income countries than middle income countries, whereas population and economic growth 
tend to constrain ICT adoption with low income countries more negatively affected than middle 
income countries. The results further demonstrate that ICT adoption affects development 
strongly, and that such effects are comparable to those of domestic credit and foreign direct 
investment. Ceteris paribus, external factors like foreign aid are more limiting to inclusive 
development than internal factors. This suggests that developing countries can enhance their 
ICT adoption for development by improving formal institutions and by strengthening domestic 
determinants of ICT adoption. Both represent opportunities for further research. 
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1. Introduction  
In the past twenty years or so, there has been a major change in thinking about the appropriate 
role of telecommunications as growth and development enhancers. The formal literature on the 
topic is extensive. For instance, it has been stated that the adoption with diffusion of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs) promote growth and growth promotes 
ICTs adoption and diffusion (Norris, 2001; Steinmueller, 2001; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; 
Wallsten, 2005, Harggitai, 1999; Quibria et al., 2000; Dasgupta et al., 2001; Oxley & Yeung, 
2001; Robison & Crenshaw, 2002; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Bellock & Dimitrova, 2003; Chinn 
& Fairlie, 2007). Billón, Marco and Lera-Lopez (2009) studied the patterns and factors 
affecting the adoption
1
of ICTs in developed and developing countries. They found that 
economic growth especially the service sector of it, education, and government effectiveness 
explain high ICT adoption rates in developed countries, while in developing countries it is the 
age of the urban population and internet costs that affect ICT adoption rates positively and 
negatively, respectively. Kiessling (2007) associated ICT adoption in 82 developed and 
developing countries with economic, financial, and political institutions, as well as with per 
capita income and education. He discovered that institutional effects on ICT adoption varied 
across countries, but that they were comparable in terms of magnitude to those of education and 
per capita GDP. However, studies like Kiessling’s remain few and even fewer of them address 
the role of formal institutions in ICT adoption. In this limited sense, Dekimpe, Parker and 
Sarvary (2000) are correct in asserting that existing models “are not very useful to explain the 
breadth of technology adoption across countries, [mainly because] they treat each country as a 
homogeneous unit, and cannot explain why some countries have a higher probability of 
adopting in a given year than others” (p. 3). Such models neglect the “wildfire phenomenon” in 
the spread of innovations outlined in Amavilah (2008; 2007). Moreover, Wejnert (2002) and 
Young (2004; 2005; 2007) address similar issues as well. Furthermore, formal comparisons of 
the relative influences of each institutional quality indicator on ICT within developing countries 
are also missing from existing literature (for an extensive review of technology adoption 
theories, see for instance, Geroski, 2000; Rogers, 1995). 
The aim of this study is, first, to empirically assess the effects of good governance on 
ICT adoption at the country level. We analyze variations in ICT adoption across a group of 49 
African countries as an illustration of how ICT catalyzes development in developing countries 
                                                          
1
Where the term “adoption” appears in this study, it should be read and understood as “adoption with diffusion.” Under 
conditions of rapid technological change an ICT that is just adopted, may never be diffused, and for this reason we stress ICTs 
that have been adopted and penetrating the economy as catalysts for inclusive development. 
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(Appendix 1). Particularly, on the left-hand side (LHS) of our estimations we consider the 
adoption of two technologies: cellular (mobile) phone, and Internet. Obviously this list can be 
extended to include personal computers, broadband users, land telephone lines, etc. However, 
among ICTs newer technologies and/or new uses of old technologies have had stronger impacts 
than others. Hence, our choice of the two is enough to explain the disparities in ICT adoption 
among developing countries and the implications of doing so for catalyzing development.  
As we discuss further later, some of the dependent variables employed in this study are: 
mobile phone, and internet, penetration rates. The disparity in these rates approximate 
differences in ICT adoption, so that we include measures of the quality of formal institutions as 
predictors, and several controls. Second, once we estimated factors influencing ICT adoption, 
we examine how ICT catalyzes development. Such an approach departs from previous studies 
which have used indexes of institutional quality such that aggregation ignores the relative 
importance of the weight of the factors in the index (Billón et al., 2009; Caselli & Coleman, 
2001) in all this. Our main hypothesis is that cross-country differences in institutional quality, 
and hence ICT adoption enhances or limits inclusive development. As proxies for good 
governance, we employ the World Bank indicators of governance.  
The paper  is organized as follows: Section 2 below provides a short theoretical stand 
behind the empirical model in Section 3. We describe key variables and data in Section 4, and 
implement the empirical model in Section 5. The results and their implications are in Section 6, 
and Section 7 draws conclusions from the exercise.  
 
2. Theoretical Standing 
We assume a basic Schumpeterian model in which the economic activity is described as 
𝑌𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖
𝛼𝑖Si
βiXi
γi) exp(µ
𝑖
) (1)       
where, 𝑌𝑖   is the real GDP of the i
th
 economy. In Schumpeter’s terminology 𝐴𝑖 (technology, 
including ICT) and 𝑆𝑖  (socio-economic setting, including institutions) are “evolution 
components” and 𝑋𝑖 are “growth components”, including conventional factors of production 
(Schumpeter, 2005[1911]; cf. Becker, Eblinger, Hedtke, and Knudsen, 2005; Bazhal, 2016). 
Key to growth among 𝑋𝑖 is capital accumulation, which over time depends on investment (I) 
equal to savings in a steady state, and savings come from profit made possible by technological 
change and the socio-economic setting surrounding it. The evolution of the socio-economic 
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environment is a function of resources, technology, and the level of development. In other 
words, 
𝑑𝐾𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘 [
𝑑𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝜋𝑖(𝐴𝑖, 𝑆𝑖))] ,
𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑠(𝑋𝑖, 𝐴𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖), 𝜋 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(2)    
A Schumpeterian technological change is discontinuous due to five initiators: (a) introduction 
of new ideas, requiring technological know-how; (b) introduction of new production techniques 
for which funds (credit) is essential; (c) discovery of new sources of supply; (d) discovery of 
new markets; and (e) change in the structure and organization of the industry involved. Thus, in 
dynamic form (1) is characterized by the Schumpeter-Kondratiev waves (cycles), such that 𝐴𝑖 
is sinusoid, i.e.,  
𝐴𝑖(𝑡) = 𝐴0 exp  (𝜑 𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑠 (𝑏𝑡 +  𝜓) 
and for φ < 0, 𝐴𝑖 is decaying, and expanding if φ > 0. Such a view is consistent with Dekimpe, 
Parker, and Sarvary’s (2000) Equations 3 and 4 (p. 6), but we do not pursue this line of thought 
further. Instead, from (1) we solve for 𝐴𝑖 as 
𝐴𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖
1/𝛼𝑖𝑆𝑖
−𝛽𝑖/𝛼𝑖𝑋𝑖
−𝛾𝑖/𝛼𝑖       (3) 
Then dividing both sides of (3) by some specific 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
∗ such as population or labor (worker), 
and taking the natural logs on both sides, we get a per capita (per labor, per worker, per head) 
indicator of adoption with diffusion) as follows: 
Ȧ𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖
∗ẏ
𝑖
+  𝛽𝑖
∗ṡ𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖
∗ẋ𝑖 + µ𝑖     (4) 
where Ȧ = log (
𝐴𝑖
𝑋𝑖
∗) = 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖;  𝛼𝑖
∗ =
1
𝛼
;  ẏ
𝑖
= 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ; 𝛽𝑖
∗ =
𝛽𝑖
𝛼𝑖
; ṡ𝑖 = log (
𝑆𝑖
𝑋𝑖
∗) =
𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ; 𝛾𝑖
∗ =
𝛾𝑖
𝛼𝑖
;  ẋ𝑖 =  
𝑋𝑖
𝑋𝑖
∗ =
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 µ
𝑖
= 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚. The model is 
next. 
3. Empirical Model 
The empirical set-up formally examines the impact of formal institutions (S) on ICT adoption 
(Ȧ), i.e., the estimated (4) has the following general (reduced) form: 
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Ȧ𝑖 ≡ 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖
∗𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖
∗𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖
∗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜆𝑖 +  𝜈𝑖
       (5) 
for λ = country-fixed effect. Although assumed fixed we understand country-effect are all 
bunches other dummy-effects due to time and regional variations.  
Again, ICT represents the average ICT adoption as cellular (mobile) phones and internet in this 
case, and 𝛼𝑖
∗, 𝛽𝑖
∗, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾𝐼
∗  are parameters to be estimated. Moreover, to illustrate how ICT 
adoption catalyzes development we insist that economic growth promotes ICT adoption, and 
the relationship between GDP and ICT adoption is well documented in the development 
literature. For example, Harggitai (1999), Quibria et al (2000), Kiiski and Pohjola (2002), 
Bellock and Dimitrova (2003), and Chinn and Fairlie (2007) all have shown that GDP is a large 
determiner of Internet access. Also GDP helps us assess the effects of the income levels on ICT 
adoption among developing countries. Furthermore, the education attainment of the population 
can also affect the delay in adopting ICT technologies. We expect this variable to have a 
positive association with ICT adoption decisions. 
Finally, ICT catalyzes development. However, there is no commonly agreed up definition of 
development. In general development implies structural change in the economy that is 
accompanied by measurable improvement in quality of life of the people. That leaves us with 
the difficulties of measuring development. Many times development is measured as 
improvements in the human development index (HDI), real GDP per capita, labor markets (low 
unemployment, high wages, better working conditions, etc.), financial markets, productivity, 
competitiveness, poverty reduction, human capital and technological knowledge, globalization, 
health, and security. Even so, we can still specify Development as a function of ICT estimated 
in (5), i.e., 
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ≡ 𝐼𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛿0𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑖𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖
∗ +  𝛿2𝑖𝑍𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖,   (6)  
  
where, IHDI is the inequality adjusted human development index,  δ are coefficients of 
development to be estimated, 𝐼𝐶𝑇𝑖
∗ ≡ Ȧ𝑖 is estimated from (5), and Z are the determinants of 
Development not already included in (5). There is a lot on (5) in the literature, see, e.g., 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2003), Detschew (2007), UN (2004), Papaioannou, and Dimelis (2007), 
Gholami et al. (2010), Seo et al. (2009), and so on, but first consider key variables and data 
next. The next section provides details about the key variables and associated data. 
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4. Key Variables and Data 
4.1  Dependent variables for ICT adoption (A = ICT)  
As proxies for ICT adoption, we examine two ICT technologies: mobile phone penetration and 
internet penetration rates. Of course, this can be extended to broadband users, telephone lines, 
etc. Unlike Caselli and Coleman (2001) who measure adoption of computers as investment per 
worker of computer produced domestically and/or imported, here dependent variables are 
measured as the rate of adoption of ICT per 100 people. The adoption of these dependent 
variables is consistent with recent African knowledge economy literature (Tchamyou, 2015). 
 
4.2 Determinants of ICT adoption with diffusion  
Many factors determined ICT adoption. However, in this chapter we stress only a few 
predictors, beginning with formal institutions. 
 
4.2.1 Institutions and Institutional Quality (S)  
Our key explanatory variable of interest is governance, which is a multidimensional and broad 
term. We define governance as the way in which policy makers are empowered to make 
decisions and the manner in which policy decisions are formulated and executed. The 
governance data come from Kauffmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2010) and the World Bank2.  
To operationalize this concept, we use a set of governance indicators that capture 
different aspects of governance. The World Bank indicators meet this requirement because they 
are constructed from several sources including polls of experts, and surveys of residents, and 
entrepreneurs within a country, and they could be grouped into three concepts (Kaufmann et al., 
2010). The first concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability, and political stability. The second 
has to do with the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver 
services (Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last 
deals with the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among 
them (Institutional Governance): rule of law, and control of corruption. 
Each indicator, normalized to range from −2.5 to 2.5, with a zero mean and a standard 
deviation of one, provides a subjective assessment of some aspect of a country’s quality of 
governance. Higher values signal better governance. Although the quality of available data 
suffers from the data aggregation problems, one of the advantages of aggregate indicators is 
                                                          
2
The World Bank data is available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.  
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that they are more informative about broad concepts of governance. Individual data provides a 
noisy signal of the broader concept of governance, which is good for statistical significance and 
not necessarily for economic significance. Aggregate indicators also provide a countrywide 
coverage than individual indicators do. Moreover, we employ each indicator in isolation as they 
measure different aspects of the impact of formal institutions on ICT adoption.  
When looking at institutional quality indices, note that there is likely to be less random 
variations, or significant trends over time. Even so, institutional quality is expected to influence 
ICT adoption. Although we do not test for it, the causality channel is likely to be as follows: 
poor institutions would influence aggregate economic growth through productivity 
improvements. This would be an important channel for the effect of institutions on economic 
growth. Moreover, we control for other variables like per capita income, level of education, and 
so on as pointed out previously. 
 
4.2.2 Other variables (X)  
Previous research has used many explanatory variables. Billón et al.  (2009), for example,  
argued that disparities in ICT adoption depend on GDP per capita, population aged 15-64 years 
old, the fraction of GDP that comes from the service sector, foreign trade as a percentage of 
GDP,  the country’s population density, the country’s size of the urban population, educational 
level measured conventionally as years of schooling, government effectiveness, and dummies 
for the dominant market structure in, language, and income level of the country. 
Focusing on the computers, Caselli and Coleman (2001) associate adoption with 
income per worker, and investment per worker calculated either as investment in the computing 
power of the country, value of imports of computing goods and services, or the sum of the two. 
Other variables they included were: the shares of GDP originating from agriculture and 
manufacturing, government spending as a percentage of GDP, manufactured imports from the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as non-OECD 
countries, the country’s structure of property rights, and a dummy for language. A notable 
exception here is the omission of human capital. 
Kiessling (2007) examines cellular telephony, internet, and personal computers (PC). 
His study is closest to ours in the stress it places on economic, financial, and political 
institutions. Good economic institutions attract foreign interactions (investment, trade, aid), and 
are effective tools in devising effective government anti-diversion and anti-corruption policies 
(no corruption). Among economic variables, Kiessling (2007) also includes general price levels 
represented by consumer prices indices (CPIs). This inclusion is good because cross-country 
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comparison based on common prices are better than those made based on exchange rates; many 
developing countries have more than one exchange rates running parallel. 
Financial institutions are intermediaries that either provide free market opportunities, or 
are friendly to the creation and delivery of such opportunities. How good these institutions are, 
is normally reflected in going rates of return on private investment, existence of a vibrant 
entrepreneurial activity and private credit, effective demand for ICTs (supply is not so 
important since ICTs can be transferred from abroad, for instance). Note that the existence of 
entrepreneurs with access to private credit is a key driver of capital formation in a 
Schumpeterian model – Equation 2 above. Among political institutions Kiessling used Polity 2, 
freedom of press, and rule of law, and ended his specification with the importance of education 
and income. 
It is abundantly clear that ICT adoption depends on economic development measured as 
GDP per capita. The impacts on ICT adoption of human capital, and the percentage of 
population who have completed some form of tertiary education, the percentage of human 
resources in  research and development (R & D), and cultural variables like language are 
critical, and we consider these as controls. 
 
4.3  Key Development Dependent variables (Development)  
The literature on the link between ICT and development is huge. The work by the UNCTAD 
(2006; 2011), UNDP (2008; 2010), and World Bank (2009; 2012) alone counts in hundreds of 
papers, conferences, workshops, meetings, and so on. The problem is that development is one 
of those things that nearly everyone knows it and no-one knows how to measure it, or at best 
there is no agreed upon measure of development. Some measure development as economic 
development, approximated by economic (real GDP per capita) growth. In truth development is 
broader than economic development, which is in turn wider than economic growth. However, it 
would not be appropriate to use GDP per capita growth again, because we used it already as a 
determinant of ICT. 
An alternative measure of development is the Human Development Index (HDI). The 
HDI is broader than real GDP as it encompasses real GDP, and human capital formation in its 
health and education dimensions. It also has an additional advantage that it can be adjusted for 
inequalities due to income, wealth, poverty, gender, and so on. One of the HDI weaknesses is 
that it is an index, and therefore lacks sufficient variation and may cause some statistical 
problems in small sample regressions. However, Binder and Georgiadis (2011) argued that the 
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HDI and real GDP are affected by variables such as macro-policies differently. In this study we 
opt for the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI). 
 
4.4  Key Development Determinants  
The determinants of development are probably just as many and complex as development itself.  
Estimated ICT (Ȧ ≡ ICT*)  
For a set of predictors, we emphasize the role of ICT adoption as estimated in Equation 5. This 
is just another way of acknowledging the importance of formal institutions in development 
acting through ICT adoption, which differs from Binder and Georgiadis (2011), Rodrik (2000; 
2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), Acemoglu, et al., (2001), Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004), and many others. 
 
Other development determinants (Z)  
Along with ICT, other determinants of development would include: Geography, foreign trade, 
FDI, remittances, and so on. Here too the literature is vast (see, e.g..,Anand et al., 2012; 
Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). In a recent paper Livramento and Foray 
(2007), development is represented by “high growth entrepreneurship,” which is driven by 
trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The paper is a Baumolian-Schmpumpterian 
emphasis on the entrepreneur as a driver of dynamic development, long with the level of the 
country’s development, inflation rate, interest rate, and unemployment rate. We use domestic 
credit as a proxy for local capital market performance. 
 
4.5  Data  
Appendix 1 lists the group of countries included in this study. We modify the World Bank 
country classification in only two groups: low income and middle income. We do so because in 
the high income category there are only two African countries: Equatorial Guinea and 
Seychelles. The upper middle income group has only five African countries. This adjustment is 
defensible because one can argue that these countries are not advanced in terms of ICT.  
As Appendix 2 shows the data used in this study were extracted from several sources. 
For instance, Appendix 2.1 defines ICT variables and data sources. Appendices 2.2 and 2.3 
display ICT descriptive statistics and a uniform sample correlation matrix. Our ICT dependent 
variables are internet penetration and mobile penetration rates.  
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Appendices 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, respectively, deal with variable definitions and data sources, 
descriptive statistics, and uniform size correlation matrix for the development variable, which 
we measure as inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI). 
The human development index (HDI) is defined as the average of results in three main 
areas, notably: (i) knowledge, (ii) decent living standards and (iii) health and long life. In 
addition to accounting for the average levels of achievements, the IHDI further accounts for the 
manner in which such achievements are distributed within the population by controlling the 
mean values of achievements for inequality. It follows that the IHDI adjusts the HDI for 
inequality. Control variables for the human development equation are: development assistance, 
private domestic credit, remittance and foreign direct investment. The choice of these variables 
is consistent with recent literature on inclusive development/growth (Anand et al., 2012; 
Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). Their expected signs are discussed 
concurrently with the presentation of results. 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
Our strategy involves estimating a set of Equations 5 and 6. The first regression in both cases is 
for the entire sample of 49 countries, disregarding income level categories. The second 
regression focuses on 28 low-income countries; the third on 21middle income countries. We 
use two related estimators: Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and instrumental variable (IV) 
Fixed Effects (FE), corrected for an unknown form of heteroscedasticity. The latter 
acknowledges issues regarding the joint determination (causality) of ICT adoption and 
development. The former acknowledges that the link between ICT and development may not be 
a direct one. 
This simple approach is informative as an indirect test for the efficiency and consistence of 
parameters, as well avoiding potential endogeneity issues.  
 
6. Results 
Tables 1-5 present the results obtained from the 2SLS and the IV FE estimation of Equations 5 
and 6 above. Specifically Table 1 shows 2SLS effects of formal institutions on mobile phone 
penetration across the full sample of 49 African countries (Panel A), and across the sub-samples 
of 28 low income (Panel B) and 21 middle income (Panel C) countries. On average for all 
countries formal institutions promote ICT adoption, with the governement effectiveness 
contributing the largest. Considering the 28 low income and the 21 middle income countries 
separately, formal institutions strongly determine ICT adoption in all cases, except for the 
12 
 
quality of regulations which undermines ICT adoption in middle income countries. This is 
probably because the regulations in place are not sufficiently tailored towards enhancing ICT 
adoption. Moreover, the positive effects of corruption-control and political govenrance 
(political stability and voice & accountability) are not significant for ICT adoption in low 
income and middle income countries, respectively. 
Regarding control variables, economic and population growth have disadvantaged ICT 
adoption in this group of countries. This result is reasonable, because if population grows faster 
than GDP growth, then per capita GDP upon which the calculation of economic growth is based 
would be low and ICT adoption similarly  constrained. Furthermore, if growth does not trickle 
down to the poor segment of the population, then population segments that are socially 
under-privileged are unlike to increase ICT adoption. Such a narrative would be consistent with 
the position that in Africa, the rich prefer quality to quantity of children, and therefore have 
fewer kids than the poor (Asongu, 2013). Hence, population growth is mostly traceable to poor 
segments of the population. Overall, this interpretation is buttressed further by the fact that the 
recent growth resurgence in Africa that began in the mid 1990s has not benefited the poor 
(Fosu, 2015). In fact, a World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has 
revealed that the extreme poverty been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception 
of Africa where 45% of countries in SSA were susbtantially off-track from the MDG extreme 
povery target (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). While population and economic growth have 
demoted ICT adoption, openness to trade and human capital accumulation enhance ICT 
adoption in these countries. 
By 2SLS formal institutions also promote ICT adoption meausred as internet 
penetration (Table 2). As with cellular (mobile) phone penetration, the quality of regulation is 
inversely correlated with ICT adoption in middle income countries. Unlike in the full sample, 
population growth, and trade allied with regulation, political stability, and the rule of law affect 
ICT when the sample is disaggregated by income levels. Even so, we can still say formal 
institutions, with the exception of the quality of regulation, improves ICT adoption in these 
countries. Howver, the improvement varies by income level. Accordingly, it is apparent from 
the results that ICT adoption in SSA is driven  fundamentally by formal institutions more in 
low income countries than middle income countries.  
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Table 1. Mobile Phone Penetration and Governance, Eq. 5, 2SLS 
       
 Dependent Variable: Mobile Phone Penetration 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  26.505*** 25.298*** 27.077*** 24.833*** 26.146*** 20.469** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012) 
Political Stability(IV)  6.256*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(IV) --- 7.841*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Regulation Quality(IV) --- --- 11.064*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Government Effectiveness(IV) --- --- --- 12.392*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of Law (IV) --- --- --- --- 9.810*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption Control (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 10.970*** 
      (0.000) 
Economic Growth  -0.402 -0.581** -0.573** -0.663*** -0.505** -0.492** 
 (0.107) (0.022) (0.023) (0.008) (0.046) (0.048) 
Trade Openness  0.105** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.156*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Population Growth  -7.197*** -6.584*** -6.485*** -5.079** -6.473*** -5.517** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016) (0.003) (0.010) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.148*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.172*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
Adjusted R² 0.226 0.229 0.233 0.244 0.228 0.234 
Fisher  13.40*** 13.88*** 16.69*** 14.96*** 13.71*** 14.97*** 
Observations  336 336 336 336 336 336 
       
       
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
       
Constant  2.453 5.354 7.781 5.641 5.062 -2.922 
 (0.743) (0.526) (0.377) (0.548) (0.601) (0.729) 
Governance (IV) 5.547*** 6.872*** 10.803*** 8?872*** 7.577** 3.742 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.025) (0.301) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R² 0.172 0.165 0.184 0.162 0.155 0.140 
Fisher  10.14*** 9.37*** 12.42*** 10.25*** 10.13*** 8.13*** 
Observations  223 223 223 223 223 223 
       
       
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
       
Constant  54.265* 40.600* 39.309* 38.280* 42.641* 33.900*** 
 (0.053) (0.080) (0.079) (0.094) (0.062) (0.141) 
Governance (IV) 5.791 2.915 -0.982* 10.629** 8.660* 12.334*** 
 (0.127) (0.468) (0.051) (0.039) (0.054) (0.006) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R² 0.186 0.175 0.176 0.201 0.195 0.223 
Fisher  6.32*** 5.85*** 6.73*** 6.97*** 7.18*** 8.69*** 
Observations  113 113 113 113 113 113 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.IV: Instrumental Variable. Governance (Political stability/non violence, voice & 
accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control).  
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Table 2. Internet Penetration and Governance, Eq. 5, 2SLS 
       
 Dependent Variable: Internet Penetration 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  11.095*** 10.665*** 9.825*** 10.304*** 11.144*** 9.319*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability(IV)  1.780*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)      
Voice & Accountability(IV) --- 2.177*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Regulation Quality(IV) --- --- 0.746 --- --- --- 
   (0.179)    
Government Effectiveness(IV) --- --- --- 2.466*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of Law (IV) --- --- --- --- 2.883*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption Control (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 2.944*** 
      (0.000) 
Economic Growth  0.068 0.018 0.037 0.007 0.037 0.043 
 (0.321) (0.794) (0.609) (0.913) (0.585) (0.531) 
Trade Openness  -0.008 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.005 
 (0.348) (0.840) (0.912) (0.760) (0.895) (0.608) 
Population Growth  -3.074*** -2.888*** -3.234*** -2.739*** -2.865*** -2.626*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.019** 0.018** 0.028*** 0.022** 0.020** 0.026*** 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.003) (0.011) (0.020) (0.004) 
       
Adjusted R² 0.252 0.254 0.210 0.214 0.258 0.256 
Fisher  9.95*** 5.681*** 10.00*** 10.24*** 10.75*** 9.85*** 
Observations  330 330 330 330 330 330 
       
       
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
       
Constant  0.381 -0.112 0.787 1.071 1.491 0.182 
 (0.749) (0.931) (0.506) (0.408) (0.253) (0.885) 
Governance (IV) 0.724*** 0.433 1.179** 1.385*** 1.477*** 1.090* 
 (0.001) (0.244) (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.050) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R² 0.088 0.058 0.085 0.089 0.095 0.070 
Fisher  6.07*** 2.73** 2.73** 4.25*** 4.62*** 3.94*** 
Observations  221 221 221 221 221 221 
       
       
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
       
Constant  18.058*** 14.432** 14.585** 14.063** 14.424** 13.0119** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012) (0.035) 
Governance (IV) 1.744 1.474 -3.640*** -0.326 0.044 1.671 
 (0.144) (0.195) (0.007) (0.864) (0.809) (0.279) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adjusted R² 0.183 0.180 0.207 0.169 0.176 0.180 
Fisher  5.78*** 6.05*** 5.35*** 5.44*** 5.83*** 5.82*** 
Observations  109 109 109 109 109 109 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.IV: Instrumental Variable. Governance (Political stability/non violence, voice & 
accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control).  
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To examine the strengths of the 2SLS results, we ran the Hausman test for endogeneity, and the 
choice of the IV FE approach was based on that outcome. IV FE results are reported by Tables 
3 and 4. In this case government effectiveness and population growth demotes ICT adoption, all 
else have positive effects. Strangely, by income levels the IV FE estimator yields negative 
instituitional effects on ICT adoption except for the corruption. Moreover, for all 49 countries, 
corruption, regualtion, trade, and population growth assist ICT adoption, and all else have 
negative effects, although statistically insignificant in most cases. Disaggregated by income 
levels, political stability, and corruption decrease ICT adoption in low income countries, and 
ICT adoption is favored by political stability, regulatory quality , and government effectivenes 
in middle income coume countries. The negative effects may be tracaeable to the fact that 
formal institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ICT adoption when 
country-specific effects are considered. In interpretting the results, it is also important to note 
that the findings in Tables 1-2 obtained only with control for simultaneity, while those in Tables 
3-4 result from controlling for both simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. The broad 
implication herethen is that while formal institutions could enhance the adoption of ICT in 
SSA, sampled governments need to take into account country-specific institutional 
arrangements in the determination of ICT adoption policy outcomes. A corollary explanation 
may be that the weight of countries with negatively skewed government quality variables 
significantly influences the outcome of the sign of the estimated coefficient.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Mobile Phone Penetration and Governance, Eq. 5,IV FE 
       
 Dependent Variable: Mobile Phone Penetration 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  -58.915*** -77.499*** -70.767*** -101.188*** -82.532*** -54.858*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Political Stability(IV)  -1.091 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.789)      
Voice & Accountability(IV) --- -19.217** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.012)     
Regulation Quality(IV) --- --- -15.022* --- --- --- 
   (0.059)    
Government Effectiveness(IV) --- --- --- -32.896*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of Law (IV) --- --- --- --- -21.239*** --- 
     (0.009)  
Corruption Control (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 4.747 
      (0.461) 
Economic Growth  -0.655** -0.565** -0.662** -0.481* -0.672** -0.671** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.017) (0.078) (0.015) (0.017) 
Trade Openness  0.039 0.051 0.035 -0.001 0.066 0.048 
 (0.686) (0.596) (0.715) (0.984) (0.497) (0.628) 
Population Growth  0.804 1.837 1.238 4.641 2.597 0.068 
 (0.839) (0.640) (0.753) (0.238) (0.513) (0.986) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.836*** 0.875*** 0.855*** 0.958*** 0.876*** 0.840*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Hausman test  26.23*** 32.71*** 30.90*** 46.70*** 33.23*** 22.56*** 
Within R² 0.154 0.170 0.162 0.204 0.172 0.153 
Fisher  10.28*** 11.79*** 11.11*** 14.71*** 11.88*** 10.39*** 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  336 336 336 336 336 336 
       
       
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
       
Constant  -59.305*** -67.618*** -71.693*** -117.286*** -106.260*** -68.206*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Governance (IV) -5.702 -11.355 -14.384 -36.718*** -32.822*** -12.576 
 (0.157) (0.151) (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.102) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Within R² 0.212 0.212 0.215 0.283 0.261 0.215 
Fisher  10.19*** 10.20*** 11.35*** 14.94*** 13.36*** 10.36*** 
Countries  29 29 29 29 29 29 
Observations  223 223 223 223 223 223 
       
       
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
       
Constant  -93.280** -75.570* -73.832 -96.030** -81.145* -123.568*** 
 (0.045) (0.096) (0.116) (0.040) (0.082) (0.009) 
Governance (IV) 20.397* -43.392** -18.625 -32.938* 4.248 37.581*** 
 (0.088) (0.025) (0.364) (0.080) (0.839) (0.003) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Within R² 0.142 0.162 0.123 0.144 0.115 0.194 
Fisher  3.07** 3.57*** 2.58** 3.10** 2.40** 4.45*** 
Countries  16 16 16 16 16 16 
Observations  113 113 113 113 113 113 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.IV: Instrumental Variable. Governance (Political stability/non violence, voice & 
accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control).  
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Table 4. Internet Penetration and Governance (Eq. (5))IVFE 
       
 Dependent Variable: Internet Penetration 
 Panel A: Full Sample  
       
 Political Governance Economic Governance Institutional Governance 
 Political Stability Voice  & Regulation Government Rule of Law Corruption 
 /Non  Violence Accountability Quality Effectiveness  Control 
       
Constant  -1.883 -3.517 -0.998 -4.387 -3.003 -0.535 
 (0.552) (0.306) (0.767) (0.233) (0.406) (0.866) 
Political Stability(IV)  0.719 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.357)      
Voice & Accountability(IV) --- -1.023 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.484)     
Regulation Quality(IV) --- --- 1.727 --- --- --- 
   (0.266)    
Government Effectiveness(IV) --- --- --- -1.459 --- --- 
    (0.339)   
Rule of Law (IV) --- --- --- --- -0.443 --- 
     (0.780)  
Corruption Control (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 2.842** 
      (0.023) 
Economic Growth  -0.086 -0.078 -0.083 -0.075 -0.084 -0.090* 
 (0.107) (0.144) (0.120) (0.163) (0.116) (0.090) 
Trade Openness  0.019 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.020 0.024 
 (0.298) (0.290) (0.304) (0.362) (0.296) (0.199) 
Population Growth  1.236 1.365* 1.247 1.479* 1.343* 0.913 
 (0.104) (0.073) (0.100) (0.058) (0.081) (0.235) 
Primary School Enrolment  0.028 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.030 0.032 
 (0.235) (0.187) (0.258) (0.151) (0.205) (0.169) 
       
Hausman test  20.16*** 20.37*** 18.15*** 19.14*** 18.77*** 12.75** 
       
Within R² 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.030 0.027 0.044 
Fisher  1.75 1.67 1.83 1.76 1.59 2.64** 
Countries  44 44 44 44 44 44 
Observations  330 330 330 330 330 330 
       
       
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
       
Constant  -1.144 2.097 -3.274 -6.129** -5.484* -0.216 
 (0.604) (0.408) (0.215) (0.032) (0.051) (0.931) 
Governance (IV) 0.996** 0.003 -0.558 -2.027* -1.799 1.702* 
 (0.042) (0.923) (0.616) (0.058) (0.105) ((0.085) 
       
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Within R² 0.071 0.050 0.051 0.068 0.063 0.065 
Fisher  2.88** 2.01* 2.05* 2.76** 2.55** 2.63** 
Countries  28 28 28 28 28 28 
Observations  221 221 221 221 221 221 
       
       
 Panel C: Middle Income Countries 
       
Constant  3.314 4.188 -0.965 2.796 2.589 -3.807 
 (0.782) (0.725) (0.935) (0.817) (0.828) (0.757) 
Governance (IV) -1.084 -5.439 9.844** -0.364 2.788 5.678* 
 (0.724) (0.261) (0.049) (0.938) (0.589) (0.075) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Within R² 0.049 0.061 0.089 0.048 0.051 0.082 
Fisher  0.92 1.16 1.73 0.89 0.95 1.57 
Countries  16 16 16 16 16 16 
Observations  109 109 109 109 109 109 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.IV: Instrumental Variable. Governance (Political stability/non violence, voice & 
accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control).  
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The findings in Table 5 are about ICT as a catalyst for inclusive development estimated by the 
2SLS (Columns 2-5) and IV FE (Columns 6-9) methods.  Full sample, ICT adoption (mobile 
phone and internet penetration) clearly and strongly affect inclusive human development. The 
effects of ICT adoption on development are comparable to those of private domestic credit 
availability and foreign direct investment. The fact that foreign aid limits inclusive human 
development is consistent with conclusions of Asongu (2014) in Africa. Moreover, positive 
effects of private domestic credit and foreign direct investment are also in accordance with 
recent inclusive growth/development literature on developing countries (Anand et al., 2012; 
Mlachila et al., 2014;Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). Clearly, ICT adoption increases inclusive 
development, and the propensity to do so is higher in low income countries than in middle 
income countries. However, just as clearly, the evidence of this study shows that holding ICT 
adoption constant, there is competition between domestic factors and forces tending to increase 
development and external factors and forces ending the opposite direction. 
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Table 5. ICT and Inclusive Human Development (2SLS and Fixed Effects) 
         
 Dependent Variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index 
         
 Two-Stage Least Squares Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects 
         
 Panel A: Full Sample 
         
Constant  0.403*** 0.402*** 0.422*** 0.415*** 0.436*** 0.434*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration (IV) 0.001*** 0.001*** --- --- 0.0005*** 0.0006*** --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   
Internet Penetration (IV) --- --- 0.007*** 0.007*** --- --- 0.002*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Aid  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.0001* -0.0001 0.002*** -0.0002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.088) (0.200) (0.000) (0.160) 
Private Domestic Credit   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.00003 0.00009 (0.102) 0.0009** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.925) (0.799) 0.0006* (0.020) 
Remittances   --- -0.00009 --- -0.0002 --- 0.0003 (0.053) 0.0001 
  (0.739)  (0.349)  (0.338) --- (0.792) 
Foreign Direct Investment  --- 0.001 --- 0.001** --- 0.0005**  0.0005** 
  (0.138)  (0.029)  (0.025) --- (0.026) 
         
Hausman  test --- --- --- --- 42.48*** 38.82*** 23.60*** 26.45*** 
         
Within R²/R² 0.463 0.534 0.434 0.556 0.302 0.363 0.199 0.265 
Fisher  94.30*** 43.22*** 87.75*** 64.47*** 47.36*** 30.19*** 26.37*** 18.43*** 
Countries      44 39 44 39 
Observations  375 308 365 299 375 308 365 399 
         
         
 Panel B: Low Income Countries 
         
Constant  0.374*** 0.389*** 0.381*** 0.390*** 0.377*** -68.20*** 0.370*** 0.369*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration (IV) 0.001*** 0.001*** --- --- 0.0007*** -12.576 --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.102)   
Internet Penetration (IV) --- --- 0.010*** 0.010*** --- --- 0.005*** 0.005*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
         
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Within R²/R² 0.296 0.266 0.236 0.339 0.378 0.440 0.375 0.467 
Fisher  48.28*** 14.47*** 24.25*** 28.82*** 42.82*** 25.24*** 41.29*** 27.21*** 
Countries  --- --- --- --- 28 24 28 24 
Observations  242 189 237 184 242 189 237 184 
         
         
 Panel C: Middle  Income Countries 
         
Constant  0.494*** 0.472*** 0.514*** 0.492*** 0.531*** 0.511*** 0.523*** 0.501*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile Phone Penetration (IV) 0.001*** 0.001*** --- --- 0.0004*** 0.0004*** --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   
Internet Penetration (IV) --- --- 0.005*** 0.005*** --- --- 0.001** 0.001** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.019) (0.035) 
         
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Within R²/R² 0.382 0.546 0.399 0.582 0.253 0.314 0.147 0.191 
Fisher  25.31*** 27.96*** 34.24*** 44.13*** 12.91*** 9.09*** 6.29*** 4.49*** 
Countries  --- --- --- --- 16 15 16 15 
Observations  133 119 128 115 133 119 128 115 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumental Variable.  
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7. Conclusion 
We have argued in the chapter that ICT adoption is a catalyst for inclusive development of 
developing countries, and scrutinized data for 49 African countries to support our argument. 
Using 2SLS and IV FE strategies, first we examined the impact of formal institutions on ICT 
adoption and found them strong at both the aggregate and disaggregated levels, with 
government effectiveness having the largest positive effects and regulations the biggest 
negative effects. Overall formal institutions appear more important to ICT adoption in low 
income countries than in middle income countries, suggesting increasing returns to ICT in low 
income countries and constant or diminishing returns in middle income countries. Population 
and economic growth tend to constrain ICT adoption with low income countries more 
negatively affected than middle income countries. 
 
Next we have assessed how estimated ICT adoption catalyzes development. Here the results are 
unambiguous that ICT adoption has strong and statistically significant effects on inclusive 
development. The positive effects on inclusive development of ICT adoption compare well to 
those of domestic private credit and foreign direct investment. Given positive ICT adoption 
impacts, we conclude that it is external factors like foreign aid than internal factors like the 
availability of credit which hinder development in these countries. Middle income countries 
gain more from ICT adoption for development than low income countries. However the 
disparities are complicated by other factors limiting development. We conclude further that for 
this group of countries, domestic factors and forces have tended to increase, while external 
forces have restricted, development. 
 
The policy implications of the results suggest the need for improvements in formal institutions, 
and the strengthening of domestic sources of ICT adoption and inclusive development. Doing 
so may require less stress on external factors like foreign aid, and that too would carry an 
opportunity cost. For future research there remains a need to broaden the sample to include 
more or all developing countries, and to fine-tune both the modelling and estimation 
techniques.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1.Country Classification by Income Level 
Countries are classified by the World Bank as developing if they are low income ($0- $1,045 
per capita) and lower middle income ($1,046-$4,125 per capita). Countries with upper middle 
incomes ($4,126-$12, 735 per capita) and high incomes ($12,736 or higher) are classified as 
being developed. A few remarks are worth keeping in mind: The classification is arbitrary. No 
particular line of reasoning is given for why the cut-off point is at $12,735, and there is no 
reason to believe that a country just below the cut-off line cannot be more “developed” than a 
country just above it. For instance, Equatorial Guinea has a higher income than both China and 
South Africa, but its industrial and technological structure is miles far behind. This is one of the 
reasons we modified the World Bank and group African countries into two groups: low income 
group consisting of 28 countries, and middle income group made up of 21 countries. This 
reclassification is consistent with our understanding of both ICT and development in these 
countries. The latter is broader than income level, the former more reflective of the general 
technological advancement of these countries.  
Income Levels Countries  
Low income countries ($ 1,045 
or less) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo, Dem. Rep, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, The, Guinea, Guinea-Bisau, 
Dem. People's Rep.¸ Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia , South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zimbabwe 
Middle Income countries 
($1,046- 12,735) 
Angola, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco,? Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia  
Source: World Bank available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income 
(Accessed on June 2016) 
 
Appendix 2.1.ICT Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Mobile Phone  Mobile  Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Telephone  Telephone Telephone  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
 
 
Political Stability  
 
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Voice & 
Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to which 
a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media” 
 
WGI 
    
 
Government 
 
 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
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Effectiveness  GE political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”. 
WGI 
    
 
Regulation Quality 
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Corruption-Control 
 
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
 
 
Rule of Law  
 
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
 
 
 
WGI 
    
GDP growth GDPg GDP growth rate WDI 
    
Trade Openness  Trade Import plus Exports of Goods and Services (%  of GDP) WDI 
    
Population growth Population Total Population growth (anual %) WDI 
    
Education  PSE Primary School Enrolment (% of Gross) WDI 
    
WGI: World Governance Indicators.  WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2.2.ICT Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Mobile Phone Penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
Telephone Penetration  3.039 5.810 0.005 32.455 565 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Rule of Law  -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Trade Openness  78.177 36.138 20.964 209.874 597 
Population Growth  2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Education  97.446 25.895 32.199 181.700 470 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
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Appendix 2.3: ICT Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 407) 
              
                           Governance Variables                Control Variables  Dependent Variables   
PolS VA GE RQ CC RL GDPg Trade Popg PSE Mobile Internet Telephone  
1.000 0.636 0.605 0.538 0.614 0.767 -0.084 0.253 -0.271 0.255 0.298 0.312 0.470 PolS 
 1.000 0.740 0.727 0.612 0.787 0.018 0.014 -0.250 0.248 0.274 0.325 0.459 VA 
  1.000 0.845 0.979 0.874 0.030 0.021 -0.335 0.212 0.293 0.320 0.504 GE 
   1.000 0.649 0.772 -0.025 -0.002 -0.247 0.217 0.264 0.176 0.286 RQ 
    1.000 0.817 -0.090 -0.014 -0.309 0.118 0.273 0.342 0.565 CC 
     1.000 -0.044 0.109 -0.286 0.219 0.274 0.332 0.530 RL 
      1.000 0.029 0.157 0.083 -0.043 -0.002 -0.052 GDPg 
       1.000 -0.380 0.167 0.259 0.158 0.228 Trade 
        1.000 -0.172 -0.331 -0.414 -0.581 Popg 
         1.000 0.288 0.224 0.181 PSE 
          1.000 0.690 0.479 Mobile 
           1.000 0.695 Internet  
            1.000 Telephone  
              
PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: 
Rule of Law.  GDPg : GDP per capita growth rate. Popg: Population growth. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. Mobile: Mobile Phone 
Penetration. Internet: Internet Penetration. Telephone: Telephone Penetration. 
 
 
Appendix 3.1: IHDI Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
    
Inclusive 
development 
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index UNDP 
    
Mobile Phone  Mobile  Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
Telephone  Telephone Telephone  subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI 
    
    
Foreign Aid   Aid Total Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Private Credit  Credit Private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions (% of 
GDP) 
WDI 
    
Remittance  Remit  Remittance inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Foreign 
investment 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment net inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
UNDP: United Nations Development Program. WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
Appendix 3.2.IHDI Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Inequality Adj. Human Development  0.721 3.505 0.129 0.768 485 
Mobile Phone Penetration  23.379 28.004 0.000 147.202 572 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
Telephone Penetration  3.039 5.810 0.005 32.455 565 
Foreign Aid  11.687 14.193 -0.253 181.187 606 
Private Domestic Credit 18.551 22.472 0.550 149.78 507 
Remittances  3.977 8.031 0.000 64.100 434 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. Adj: Adjusted.  
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Appendix 3.3.IHDI Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 324) 
         
Foreign aid Credit Remittances FDI Mobile Internet Telephone IHDI  
1.000 -0.173 -0.037 0.411 -0.165 -0.196 -0.223 -0.382 Foreign aid 
 1.000 -0.084 -0.065 0.514 0.511 0.614 0.529 Credit 
  1.000 0.115 -0.050 -0.035 -0.062 -0.027 Remittances 
   1.000 0.111 0.072 -0.029 -0.001 FDI 
    1.000 0.749 0.504 0.626 Mobile 
     1.000 0.669 0.649 Internet  
      1.000 0.747 Telephone 
       1.000 IHDI 
         
Credit: Private domestic credit. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration. Internet: Internet Penetration. Telephone: 
Telephone Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
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